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Abstract 
We use a panel of 155 countries for 1970-2010 to study (two-way) causality between government 
spending, revenue and growth. Our results suggest the existence of weak evidence supporting 
causality from expenditures or revenues to GDP per capita and provide evidence supporting 
Wagner’s Law.  
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1. Introduction 
According to conventional wisdom larger budget deficits have coincided with wasteful 
government spending, large bureaucracies, and other counterproductive economic policies. Seminal 
earlier work on the impact of government expenditure on long-run growth include studies by 
Landau (1983), Ram (1986), Grier and Tullock (1989), Romer (1990), Barro (1990, 1991), 
Derajavan et al. (1996) and Sala-i-Martin (1997), mostly using cross-section data to link measures 
of government spending with economic growth rates.  
On the causality issue Hakro’s (2009) finds evidence suggesting that government expenditures 
are growth inducing. On the same sample Kumar (2009) using time series techniques instead infer 
that Wagner’s Law does hold.1  Yuk (2005) takes a long term perspective on UK time series and, 
although support for Wagner’s Law is sensitive to the choice of the sample period, there is evidence 
that GDP growth Granger-causes the share of government spending in GDP 
We use a cross-sectional/time series panel of 155 developed and developing countries for the 
period 1970-2010. In particular, we assess (two-way) causality, and also the possibility of the 
Wagner Law. Therefore, we run panel Granger causality tests and assess the existence of cross-
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1 An often quoted fact, “Wagner's Law”, about the long-run tendency for public expenditure to grow relative to some 
national income aggregate such as GDP (due to Wagner in 1883). 
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sectional dependence amongst homogeneous groups of countries. Our results show the existence of 
weak evidence supporting causality from expenditures (revenues) to GDP per capita and find 
supporting evidence for the Wagner’s Law.  
 
2. Methodology and Empirical Results 
We perform a panel version of a Granger-causality test (Huang and Temple, 2005) between per 
capita GDP and fiscal variables, namely total government expenditures and revenues retrieved from 
World Bank’s WDI for 155 countries between 1970 and 2010.  
Since causality can run in either direction, one cannot take government expenditures and 
government revenues as strictly exogenous. Alternatively, we run partial adjustment specifications 
which allow feedback by means of sequential moment conditions to identify the model (see 
Arellano, 2003). The standard approach in the literature would be an AR(1) model as follows: 
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where in our case ity  is real per capita GDP  and itx  will be independent government expenditures 
and revenues
 2
. The reverse relationship is also explored to test notably the hypothesis of the 
Wagner’s Law holding for the full sample and OECD sub-sample. 
The model (1) allows for unobserved heterogeneity through the individual effect i  that 
captures the joint effect of time-invariant omitted variables. t  is a common time effect, while itv  is 
the disturbance term. We also assume that itx  is potentially correlated with i and may be 
correlated with itv , but is uncorrelated with future shocks ,..., 21  itit vv  To make use of available 
moment conditions, we use Arellano and Bond’s (1991) difference GMM estimator (hereafter DIF-
GMM), and use Hansen J's test to assess the model specification and over-identifying restrictions. 
As there are limitations of DIF-GMM estimation, Arellano and Bover’s (1995) system-GMM 
estimator can be used to alleviate the weak instruments problem
3
.  
    In the AR(1) model, one hypothesis of economic interest is the null 01  ; a panel data test for 
Granger causality. Even though a Wald-type test of this restriction could be used, we estimate both 
the unrestricted and the restricted models using the same moment conditions, and then compare 
their (two-step) Hansen J statistics using an incremental Hansen test defined as: 
                                                        
2 Total government expenditures and revenues (% GDP) were converted to nominal levels, deflated using the CPI and 
scaled by population. 
3 In our setting, the SYS-GMM uses the standard moment conditions, while SYS-GMM1 (modified 1) only uses the 
lagged first-differences of ity  dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels and SYS-GMM2 (modified 2) only uses 
lagged first-differences of itx  dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels. 
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J  for the unrestricted model, 
and n is the number of observations.
4
 The intuition is that, if the parameter restriction ( 01  ) is 
valid, the moment conditions should keep their validity even in the restricted model.
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    There are some additional issues of interpretation. One may be interested in the stability of the 
estimated model. If our model is stable, we can compute a point estimate for the long-run effect of 
itx  on ity : 
 )1/( 11  LR ,
6
 (3) 
Moreover, we can test for unobserved heterogeneity. In the absence of individual effects, the 
following additional moment conditions become valid: 
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The validity of these additional set of moment conditions (tested using an incremental Hansen 
test relative to difference or system GMM) can be evaluated with a test for the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity (H0: no heterogeneity). The motivation for using this test is that, if 
individual effects are absent, the pooled OLS will be a consistent estimator, despite not fully 
efficient given the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
We find little evidence of robust Granger causality from per capita GDP to government 
expenditure across econometric specifications, with only one model indicating a negative short and 
long-run effect of total government expenditure on output growth (Table 1).  
However, there is stronger evidence supporting the reverse relationship, that is, from 
government expenditures to per capita GDP, therefore favouring the idea of Wagner’s Law. There 
are significant short and long-run effects, we reject the null of no Granger-causality using our two-
step Hansen incremental test, and diagnostics are well behaved (Table 2).  
[Table 1-2] 
Redoing the OECD sub-sample (not shown), we get slightly stronger results favouring Granger 
causality from government spending to GDP for a positive short-run effect in 3 out of 6 models. 
Nevertheless, no significant long-run effect emerges. For the OECD the reverse relationship still 
holds with evidence of Granger-causality from GDP to government spending, as well as positive 
and significant short and long-run effects in both the pooled OLS and FE models. 
                                                        
4
 Under the null, 
RUD  is asymptotically distributed as 
2
r where r is the number of restrictions. 
5 See Bond and Windmeijer (2005). 
6 Approximate standard error estimate for this long-run effect computed using the Delta Method. 
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3. Concluding remarks 
Using a panel data set of 155 developed and developing countries for the period 1970-2010, in a 
context where government spending and revenue have increased throughout time, we have assessed 
in which way runs causality and also the possibility of the Wagner Law. We find little evidence of 
Granger causality from per capita GDP to government expenditure across our econometric 
specifications. However, there is stronger evidence supporting the reverse relationship, from 
government expenditures to per capita GDP, therefore favouring the idea of Wagner’s Law. In 
particular, there are also significant short and long-run effects.   
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Table 1: Panel Granger-Causality – GDP per capita and Total Government Expenditures per capita 
(full sample) 
Dep.Var. real GDPpc OLS levels Within Group (FE) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument set none none Full Full Reduced Reduced 
Lag1 GDPpc  1.02*** 0.90*** 0.48*** 1.07*** 1.08*** 0.99*** 
 (0.005) (0.044) (0.133) (0.020) (0.028) (0.018) 
Lag1 totgovexppc 0.00 -0.00 -0.0002** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
       
Obs. 426 426 320 426 426 426 
R-squared 0.99 0.78     
AB AR(1) (p-value)   0.37 0.29 0.28 0.40 
AB AR(2) (p-value)   0.96 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Hansen p-value   0.24 0.20 0.20 0.29 
Granger causality p-value 0.95 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Unobs. Heterogeneity    0.44 0.02 1.00 
LR effect point estimate -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0004* 0.001 0.003 -0.01 
(standard error) (0.007) (0.0019) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.026) 
Note: Our five-year averages dataset was used to assess Granger causality. Year dummies are included in all models (coefficients not reported). 
Figures in parenthesis below point estimates are standard-errors. The GMM results reported here are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. The Hansen test is used to assess the overidentifying restrictions; the test uses the minimized value of the corresponding 
two-step GMM estimator. The difference Hansen test is used to test the additional moment conditions used by the system GMM estimators in which 
SYS GMM uses the standard moment conditions, while SYS GMM-1 only uses the lagged first-differences of GDPpc dated t-2 (and earlier) as 
instruments in levels and SYS-2 only uses lagged first-differences of totgovexp_gdp dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels. The heterogeneity 
test is used to test the null that there are no individual effects (see text). The Granger causality test examines the null hypothesis that GDPpc is not 
Granger-caused by totgovexp_gdp; the test statistic is criterion based, using restricted and unrestricted models (see main text for details). The LR 
effect is the point estimate of the long-run effect of totgovexp_gdp on GDPpc. Its standard error is approximated using the delta method. *, **, *** 
denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Panel Granger-Causality - Total Government Expenditures per capita and GDP per capita 
(full sample) 
 
Dep.Var. totgovexppc OLS levels Within Group (FE) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument set none none Full Full Reduced Reduced 
Lag1 totgovexppc 0.04 -0.98** -1.63*** -0.14 -0.12 -1.68*** 
 (0.201) (0.395) (0.476) (0.127) (0.073) (0.166) 
Lag1 GDPpc  2.43** 32.76*** 25.28 6.45* 9.49*** 12.29** 
 (0.950) (8.946) (24.939) (3.635) (2.941) (6.223) 
       
Obs. 320 320 226 320 320 320 
R-squared 0.01 0.19     
AB AR(1) (p-value)   0.26 0.29 0.29 0.25 
AB AR(2) (p-value)   0.65 0.31 0.31 0.60 
Hansen p-value   0.11 0.13 0.28 0.31 
Granger causality p-value 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Unobs. Heterogeneity    0.00 0.00 0.00 
LR effect point estimate 2.51* 16.54*** 9.62 5.67 8.47*** 4.59** 
(standard error) (1.287) (3.053) (10.053) (3.649) (2.682) (2.166) 
Note: See Table 1, mutatis mutandis. 
